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This paper studies the relationship between stock liquidity, corporate governance, and 
leverage in Indonesia. A sample of 165 Indonesian listed firms in the year 2006-2016 
is used. The study results confirm that an increase in stock liquidity and corporate 
governance decreases the use of leverage. This show that corporate governance and 
stock liquidity able to decrease the agency cost and the usage of debt. The interaction 
between stock liquidity and corporate governance shows that corporate governance 
significantly affects leverage only when the firm is liquid. However, there are different 




Penelitian ini melakukan studi hubungan antara likuiditas saham, tata kelola dan 
tingkat hutang di Indonesia. Penelitian ini menggunakan sampel 165 perusahaan 
Indonesia yang sudah terdaftar di bursa. Hasil penelitian ini mengkonfirmasi 
peningkatan likuiditas saham dan tata kelola perusahaan mengurangi penggunaan 
hutang. Hal ini menunjukkan tata kelola perusahaan dan likuiditas saham dapat 
mengurangi biaya keagenan dan penggunaan hutang. Interaksi antara likuiditas saham 
dan tata kelola perusahaan menunjukkan tata kelola perusahaan secara signifikan 
mempengaruhi tingkat hutang hanya pada perusahaan yang likuid. Akan tetapi, 
terdapat perbedaan hasil dari proksi-proksi dari kualitas tata kelola perusahaan yang 
digunakan. 
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 The capital structure decision is a popular issue in the corporate finance world. 
Managers must decide on the amount of debt and equity level used for financing their 
projects, aiming to maximize firm value by minimizing the cost of capital. According to 
Claymen et al. (2012), the decision on a firm's leverage level for an optimal capital 
structure depends on the firm's stock liquidity and corporate governance. There are 
studies that have related between stock liquidity and leverage (Lipson and Mortal, 2009) 
and between corporate governance and leverage (Jiraporn et al., 2012). Therefore, this 
paper will study the joint impact of stock liquidity and corporate governance 
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 The literatures on capital structure have been discussed in decades starting from 
the famous work by Modigliani and Miller (1958) which showed that capital structure is 
irrelevant. Theories such as the pecking-order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984), static-
trade off theory (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) have tried to explain how firms decide on their optimal capital structure. This shows 
how challenging and important this decision is, and this paper will contribute to this 
literature by showing how this decision can be affected by the firm's stock liquidity and 
corporate governance quality. 
 Stock liquidity has been shown to have significant impact on a firm such as 
increasing firm value (Fang Noe, and Tice, 2009) and increasing shareholder activism 
(Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele, 2014).  This paper relates the impact of stock liquidity 
on leverage which can be explained by several capital structure theories. The static trade-
off theory (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) suggests that a liquid stock has lower flotation 
costs which causes equity to be more attractive than debt. The pecking-order theory 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984) suggests that firms issue debt over equity when there is 
asymmetrical information. Empirical evidence in the US by Lipson and Mortal (2009) 
has also shown that there is a negative relationship between stock liquidity and leverage. 
 The effects of liquidity may be different in Indonesia compared to other countries 
due to difference in trading mechanism and regulations. The US has a quote-trading 
market where the bid and ask price are quoted by market makers (Ali et al., 2015). 
Indonesia has an order-driven market where the bid and ask price established by public-
limit orders (Chai et al., 2010).  According to Brown and Zhang (1997), an order-driven 
market has a higher liquidity than the quote-driven market. A study on the effects of 
liquidity in the order-driven market of Australia by Sivathaasan et al. (2016) has shown 
that stock liquidity negatively influences leverage. Therefore, it is interesting to compare 
the results in Indonesia with the US due to the different trading mechanism, and with 
other order-driven markets such as Australia due to the difference in size and regulations. 
 While stock liquidity by itself is known to affect leverage significantly, this paper 
takes the study further by incorporating corporate governance into the relationship. 
Corporate governance provides a monitoring mechanism on managers, and thus 
companies with better corporate governance are more transparent (Sivathaasan et al., 
2016). Since good corporate governance aligns managers and shareholder's interest, it 
causes a lower agency costs and higher shareholder value (Claymen et al., 2012).   
 The effect of corporate governance on a firm are numerous, however this paper's 
focus is its effect of a firm's leverage decisions. A study by Jiraporn et al. (2012) explains 
how corporate governance quality affects capital structure using the agency theory. The 
agency theory explains that debt is an alternative monitoring mechanism to corporate 
governance for solving the agency problem. When there is less corporate governance, 
debt will be used more as an alternative solution. Increase in debt pressures the managers 
to make better decisions as they are responsible for meeting the debt obligations. 
Therefore, higher CGQ (corporate governance quality) reduces leverage which is also 
backed up by empirical results (Jiraporn et al., 2012). 
 A study by Zhuang (2001) on the corporate governance of Indonesia show that 
most corporations are controlled by families. Families control 67.1% of publicly listed 
companies in the Jakarta Stock Exchange. This insider system differs from the US 
outsider system with dispersed shareholders determined by the market forces (Dignam 
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and Galanis, 2004). Indonesia's shareholders prefer to use debt financing for expansion 
to preserve their ownership in the family business. Indonesian listed companies with 
higher ownership concentration are shown to have higher level of leverage (Zhuang, 
2001). Therefore, the results of this study on Indonesia can have significant difference in 
the impact of corporate governance.  
 
2.  Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1  Stock Liquidity and Leverage 
 The static trade-off theory (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) states that company 
chooses between equity and debt by balancing their costs and benefits at the optimal level. 
In an imperfect market as assumed by Modigliani and Miller's second proposition, debt 
benefits from taxes. However, this benefit must be balanced with the risk of bankruptcy 
from the debt obligations. While increasing debt increases company's value due to tax 
benefits, at some point the benefit is counteracted by the cost of financial distress. 
Therefore, the optimal capital structure exists at the point where the marginal increase in 
tax benefits is equal to the expected financial distress costs. 
  An implication of this theory is that when the cost of equity is lower than cost of 
debt, then more debt will be used. A liquid stock has lower flotation costs, which is the 
costs incurred when issuing the equity from expenses such as underwriting fees and legal 
fees. Therefore, the conclusion is that a more liquid stock with lower flotation costs makes 
equity more preferred than debt.  Empirical result by Andres et al. (2014) show that stock 
liquidity affects equity returns and cost of capital. Amihud and Mendelson (1996) also 
show that firms with higher stock liquidity has lower cost of equity, thus having lower 
level of debt. 
 The pecking-order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) states that firms followed the 
order of internal financing, debt, then equity when financing. Firms will prioritize using 
internal financing as much as possible, followed by debt, then equity if needed. Debt and 
equity is avoided due to the level of asymmetrical information that they have. This implies 
a firm's capital structure is determined by their need of external financing and that firms 
with better cash flow will naturally use less debt and equity. 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance and Leverage 
 The agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is about resolving the agency 
costs that arise from the conflict of interest between the shareholders (principal) and 
managers (agent). The conflict arises because managers may have different goals than 
maximizing shareholder's value, and the shareholders may not be fully aware of the 
manager's actions. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency costs can be alleviated 
through capital structure decisions. While corporate governance is the main solution to 
the agency problem, debt can substitute it by motivating managers to make better 
decisions as they are responsible for the debt obligations.  
 The agency theory can be used to explain the relationship between corporate 
governance and leverage. Sivathaasan et al. (2016) explain that corporate governance and 
leverage can be substituted for each other as a mechanism for controlling agency 
problems. Corporate governance is an internal mechanism that monitors and set 
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regulations for the firm. Debt is an external mechanism which motivates better managerial 
decisions. According to Jiraporn et al. (2012), higher leverage substitutes weaker 
corporate governance as a means of resolving agency problems. Therefore, firms with 
better corporate governance have less need of using debt. 
2.3 Stock Liquidity, Corporate Governance, and Leverage 
 According to Ali et al. (2015), corporate governance affects stock liquidity by 
affecting the level of transparency and information asymmetries between insiders and 
outsiders. The decrease in information asymmetries increases stock liquidity lowers cost 
of equity, and therefore less use of debt (Lipson and Mortal, 2009). Empirical result by 
Ali et al. (2015) suggest that better governed firms have greatly increased stock liquidity 
in Australia.  Chung et al (2010) also show a positive relation between corporate 
governance quality and stock liquidity in the US. Then, according to Lipson and Mortal 
(2009) an increase in stock liquidity decreases the use of debt as it causes cost of equity 
to decrease and thus equity is more attractive. Therefore, the conclusion is that an increase 
in corporate governance quality increases stock liquidity which then decreases leverage. 
 
2.4 Hypothesis Development 
 The static trade-off theory states that firms choose between equity and leverage to 
minimize cost of capital. The pecking-order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) states that 
firms prefer using debt when there is more asymmetrical information on equity. 
Therefore, a more liquid stock with lower flotation costs and asymmetrical information 
will cause firms to use more equity. Since equity became more preferred over debt, the 
level of leverage will decrease. Empirical results also show a negative relationship 
between stock liquidity and leverage (e.g. Amihud and Mendelson, 1996).  
H1: Firms with higher stock liquidity experience a lower level of leverage 
 
 Based on the agency theory, firms solve their agency problems by using the 
mechanisms of corporate governance and leverage (Jiraporn et al., 2012). Corporate 
governance monitors managers, whereas leverage encourages managers to make better 
decisions. A firm with good corporate governance quality has less need of using debt as 
an external mechanism for resolving agency problems, and therefore higher corporate 
governance quality reduces leverage.  
H2: Firms with higher corporate governance quality (CGQ) has a lower level of leverage 
 According to Sivathaasan et al. (2016), the significant negative relationship 
between corporate governance quality (CGQ) and leverage only exists for firms with high 
stock liquidity in Australia. The interaction is different due to the different level of 
transaction costs from liquidity. Small firms with less liquidity have a higher level of 
transaction costs and therefore a higher expected rate of return (Stoll and Whaley, 1983). 
Therefore this paper predicts that the inverse relationship effect between CGQ and 
leverage is stronger for firms with higher liquidity than those with lower liquidity in 
Indonesia. 
H3: Firms with higher liquidity has a stronger inverse relationship between CGQ and 
leverage than lower liquidity. 
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3.  Methodology 
3.1  Data 
 The data is taken from a population of all 532 public listed firms in the Indonesian 
Stock Exchange from year 2006 - 2016 (11 years). Among the population, a sample is 
selected that meets the following criteria: 
 The firm is not a financial company. Financial companies were excluded as they are 
different in characteristics and regulations (Chang et al., 2014). 
 The firm must have been publicly listed in 2006-2016. Therefore only firms that were 
publicly listed before January 2, 2006 are selected. 
 Stock data must be complete from 2006–2016. Several firms had to be excluded due 
to the amount of missing data in Yahoo! Finance. 
 Corporate data must be complete from 2006–2016. Incomplete data results from both 
incomplete annual reports and human error. 
As a result, a sample of 165 firms with complete data were selected. The final sample 
amounts to 1815 firm-year observations. The details are as follow: 
 
Table 1. Sample Selection 
Total of publicly listed firms in Indonesian Stock Exchange 532 
Firms that are not publicly listed since 2006 222 
Firms in financial industry 56 
Firms with incomplete stock data 58 
Firms with outliers or incomplete final data 31 
Final amount of firms sample 165 
3.2  Empirical Model  
Model (1) shows the the effect of both stock liquidity and corporate governance to 
leverage. The model (2) examines the difference in the effect of CGQ to leverage when 
stock liquidity is high or low. 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐼𝑠𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝑎4𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾2𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡               (1) 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐺𝑖,𝑡 ∗  𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐺𝑖,𝑡 ∗
 𝐿𝑀𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾6𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾8𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾9𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡 +𝑢𝑖,𝑡      (2) 
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Using leverage as dependent variable (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡), model (1) examines the effect of 
stock liquidity (𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡) and corporate governance quality (𝐼𝑠𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡, 𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡, 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑇𝑖,𝑡) as 
the independent variable. Stock Liquidity is measured using Amihud illiquidity estimate 
(Amihud 2002) and turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM). We use three corporate 
governance quality which are the usage of Big 4 independent auditor ( 𝐼𝑠𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡), 
proportion of independent director (𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡)  and proportion of independent audit 
committee (𝐴𝑈𝐷𝑇𝑖,𝑡). The control Variables includes 9 variables which are Firm Size 
(𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡), Tangibility (𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡), Growth Opportunities (𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡), Firm Age (𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡), 
Profitability (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡) , Firm Risk (𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡) , Non-debt Tax Shields (𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡) , Asset 
Liquidity (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡), and Ownership Concentration (𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡). 
Model (2) uses a corporate governance variable (𝐶𝐺𝑖,𝑡) will be switch out among 
the three proxies (IsBig4, BOD, Amihud) and includes its interaction effect with Amihud 
and LM as the other independent variables. Stock liquidity variables here is turned into a 
dummy variable, where those above the median (illiquid) is 0 and those below the median 
is 1 (liquid). 
 
3.3 Research Variables 
3.3.1 Dependent variables 
 Leverage variable is measured using market leverage: 
𝑴𝑳𝒊,𝒕 =  
𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡
 
 
Where Short-Term Debt (STD) is synonymous with current liabilities, and Long-
Term Liabilities (LTD) includes all non-current liabilities that bears interests. Total Asset 
(TA) is the total book value of assets and Market Value of Equity (MVE) is equal to the 
number of shares outstanding multiplied by yearly share price. 
 
3.3.2 Independent Variables 
 
Stock liquidity is first measured using the Amihud illiquidity estimate (Amihud 
2002) as a proxy for price impact of trade: 









 Where 𝐷𝑖𝑦 is the number of days with available ratios for firm i in year t,  |𝑟𝑖𝑡| is 
the absolute yearly return of firm i in year t, and 𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 is the total daily trading volume 
of firm i in the end of year t. A higher Amihud means a lower stock liquidity. 
The second variable is the turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM) by Bilinski 
et al. (2006)  for measuring trading continuity: 
𝑳𝑴𝒊𝒚 =  [𝑁𝑜𝑍𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +  
1/(𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡)
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟
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Where 𝑁𝑜𝑍𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the number of days with zero trading volume in firm i in the end 
of year t,  𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡  of firm i in year t is the ratio of the sum of volume per year to the 
number of shares outstanding per year, and Deflator is a constant number set to 20,000 
so that 1/(𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡) is < 1.  The last multiplier is used to standardize the amount of 
trading days per year to 246 days in Indonesia, where  𝑁𝑜𝑇𝐷𝑡 is the number of trading 
days over the year. The higher the LM, the lower the stock liquidity. 
 Corporate governance quality is measured using three proxies from Subramanyam 
(1996): 
 IsBig4 is a dummy variable representing the external auditor quality of the firm. It is 
1 if the firm is audited by one of the big 4 auditors namely : Ernst & Young, 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Deloitte, and KPMG. It is 0 with other auditors. 
 BOD is the proportion of independent board commissioners in the firm, calculated as 
number of independent members divided by total number of comissioners. 
 AUDT is the proportion of independent audit comittee members in the firm, 
calculated as number of independent members divided by total number of comittee 
members. 
3.3  Operationalization of Variables 
This section is a summary of the definition of the variables explained. 
Table 2. Definition of Variables 
Leverage 
The proportion of debt that the firm uses measured 
by the total amount of debt divided by the sum of its 
total debt and market value of equity. 
Amihudit 
A stock liquidity proxy capturing the price impact of 
trade. A higher Amihud shows lower liquidity. 
LMit 
A stock liquidity proxy for measuring trading 
continuity. A higher LMshows lower liquidity. 
AmihudDummyit 
0 for firms with Amihud above median, 1 for firms 
with Amihud below median 
LMDummyit 
0 for firms with LM above median, 1 for firms with 
LM below median 
IsBig4it 
A corporate governance proxy dummy variable 
measuring the external auditor quality of the firm. It 
returns 1 if the auditor is among the Big 4 Auditing 
firms:  
BODit 
A corporate governance proxy variable measuring 
board independence. It is measured by the proportion 
of independent comissioners. 
AUDTit 
A corporate governance proxy variable measuring 
the proportion of independent auditing comittee 
members. 
Size Natural log of total assets 
Tang 
Net property, plant, and equipment divided to total 
assets 
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MTB Market value to book value ratio 
Age 
Natural log of years since the company is publicly 
listed 
ROA EBIT to total assets ratio 
Risk Standard deviation of stock returns 
NDTS Annual depreciation divided by total assets 
AssetLiq Current asset divided by current liabilities 
Top Percentage of shares owned by top shareholder 
 
4.  Empirical Results  
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Leverage     
ML 0.5302 0.2813 0.0163 0.996 
Stock Liquidity     
Amihud -11.7169 4.6394 -22.3486 -4.9743 
LM 33.5267 55.1423 0.00002 222.035 
Corporate Governance    
IsBig4 0.3983 0.4897 0 1 
BOD 0.2859 0.2411 0 0.8571 
AUDT 0.1489 0.2367 0 1 
Control Variables     
Size 21.2171 1.6644 17.9098 25.2431 
Tang 0.4973 0.2235 0.0248 0.9604 
MTB 1.6148 2.3999 -0.4616 16.3483 
Age 2.7046 0.4834 0 4.1897 
ROA 0.0654 0.1106 -0.246 0.5216 
Risk 0.0628 0.1328 0.0059 1.1389 
NDTS 0.0375 0.0505 0.0001 0.3886 
AssetLiq 2.6401 3.9318 0.1222 29.7417 
Top 0.4897 0.2149 0.093 0.9531 
 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics from the dependent variable market 
leverage (ML), the independent variables for stock liquidity (Amihud and LM) and 
corporate governance (IsBig4, BOD, AUDT) and the 9 control variables. All data except 
corporate governance variables are winsored at 0.01% to account for outliers. Market 
Leverage is higher compared to other studies such as Lipson and Mortal (2009) in the US 
and Sivathaasan et al. (2016) in Australia. This may show that firms in Indonesia tend to 
have higher leverage than other developed countries.  
Amihud and LM is an inverse indicator of stock liquidity. Which means a higher 
Amihud or LM shows a low stock liquidity, and a lower Amihud or LM shows a high 
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stock liquidity. Among these two, LM shows a significant variance with an standard 
deviation of 55.14 and large gap between the lowest and highest value.  This is caused by 
a large amount of firms with zero-volume trading days in Indonesia. Top ownership of a 
firm’s shares, or percentage of shares by largest blockholder, averages at 48.97%. This 
reflects the large amount of family ownerships in Indonesia as studied by Zhuang (2001). 
4.2 Regression Result 
 The regression result is done after treating for heteroscesdascity, autocorrelation, 
and cross-sectional dependency in the models using the Driscoll and Kraay standard 
errors method.  
Table 4. Regression Results 
  
Hypothesis 1 & 2 Hypothesis 3 
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 
Amihud 0.0037**         
(2.17)     
LM  0.0001***    
 (3.46)    
IsBig4 -0.0098 -0.0111 0.0364   
(-0.62) (-0.68) (1.66)   
BOD -0.0339** -0.0319**  0.0174  
(-2.34) (-2.16)  (0.57)  
AUDT -0.0583*** -0.0593**   -0.0397 
(-2.67) (-2.50)   (-1.76) 
IsBig4*Amihud   -0.0198**   
  (-2.00)   
IsBig4*LM   -0.0673***   
  (-4.43)   
BOD*Amihud    -0.0378**  
   (-2.10)  
BOD*LM    -0.0788***  
   (-2.92)  
AUDT*Amihud     -0.0237 
    (-1.35) 
AUDT*LM     -0.0293 
        (-1.16) 
Size 0.0168 0.0151 0.0150 0.0147 0.0127 
(1.81) (1.46) (1.35) (1.37) (1.15) 
Tang -0.239*** -0.2364*** -0.2369*** -0.2349*** -0.2389*** 
(-6.63) (-7.63) (-7.17) (-7.75) (-6.81) 
MTB -0.0374*** -0.0372*** -0.0368*** -0.3762*** -0.0374*** 
(-10.11) (-9.91) (-10.34) (-10.74) (-10.23) 
Age -0.0420 -0.0487 -0.0749 -0.0648 -0.0595 
(-0.97) (-1.12) (-1.95) (-1.47) (-1.49) 
ROA -0.4814*** -0.4702*** -0.4899*** -0.4776*** -0.4913*** 
(-11.62) (-11.44) (-12.43) (-11.76) (-11.87) 
Risk -0.0661 -0.0669 -0.0667 -0.6488 -0.0702 
(-1.17) (-1.18) (-1.24) (-1.13) (-1.23) 
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NDTS -0.0452 -0.0711 -0.0494 -0.0389 -0.0709 
(-0.91) (-1.64) (-1.08) (-0.82) (-1.65) 
AssetLiq -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.0139*** -0.1397*** -0.0141*** 
(-5.44) (-5.37) (-5.33) (-5.53) (-5.59) 
Top -0.0248 -0.0267 -0.0354 -0.0329 -0.0313 
(-0.70) (-0.73) (-0.90) (-0.91) (-0.79) 
_cons 0.6175*** 0.6219*** 0.6873*** 0.6722*** 0.6998*** 
(4.02) (3.28) (3.66) (3.91) (3.80) 
N 1815 1815 1815 1815 1815 
Adj. R2 0.3329 0.3270 0.3294 0.3283 0.3243 
t statistics in parentheses,   **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01 
 
Table 4 shows model 1 and 2 captures these two effects by regressing both stock 
liquidity and corporate governance variables to leverage. Two models are used while 
switching out between Amihud and LM to account for the different dimensions of 
liquidity that Amihud and LM captures. Amihud and LM is an inverse measurement, 
therefore a postive coefficient would actually mean a negative effect on leverage. 
Both Amihud and LM has a positive coefficient similar to studies by Amihud and 
Mendelson (1996) and Lipson and Mortal (2009). Despite having a lower coefficient, LM 
shows to be more statistically significant in affecting leverage than Amihud. BOD and 
AUDT as corporate governance proxies also shows to signifcantly decrease leverage 
similar to other studies (e.g. Jiraporn et al., 2012). However, IsBig4 fails to show a 
significant effect on leverage. According to Siregar (2008)’s research on corporate 
governance and earnings management in Indonesia, audit quality may not be a good proxy 
for corporate governance in Indonesia. For example, several studies has succesfully 
shown that audit quality affects earning management (e.g. Krishnan, 2003), however a 
study in Indonesia by Sandra and Kusuma (2004) failed to show this effect. 
For model 3, 4, and 5 we will focus on the interaction variables, which Amihud 
and LM is represented with a dummy variable. The inverse effect of Amihud and LM 
must be reconciled with the corporate governance variables, and therefore the dummy 
variables returns “0”  (illiquid) for firms above the median and “1” (liquid) for firms 
below the median. The interaction variables’ coefficient can then be interpreted as the 
effect of corporate governance on leverage in liquid firms, and the CGQ coefficient 
represents the effect in illiquid firms. 
All three corporate governance variables (IsBig4, BOD, AUDT ) in low liquidity 
fails to show a significant effect on leverage. This is as expected in the hypothesis It states 
that increased corporate governance quality significantly decreases leverage in highly 
liquid firms, however corporate governance has no significant effect on leverage in 
illiquid firm. This is because lower liquidity firms has higher transaction costs (Stoll and 
Whaley, 1983) from flotation costs such as legal and underwriting fees. Costs are higher 
because the firm has more assymetrical information and risk from illiquidity, and 
therefore using more equity in place of leverage is undesireable.  
 The interaction variables of IsBig4*Amihud, IsBig4*LM, BOD*Amihud, and 
BOD*LM is also consistent with the hypothesis. They show that IsBig4 and BOD only 
significantly decreases leverage when the firm is liquid. Furthermore, the effect of BOD 
in Model 4 has a higher coefficient than in Model 1 and 2, thus showing a stronger effect 
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in high liquidity. The effect is present and stronger in high liquidity because the firm’s 
liquidity allows debt to be replaced by equity due to lower costs and information 
assymetry. Although IsBig4 was shown to be insignificant in decreasing leverage in 
general in Models 1 & 2, Model 3 shows that it is significant when the firm is liquid. 
Unfortunately, Model 5 show results contrary to the hypotheses where AUDT*Amihud 
and AUDT*BOD is insignificant. This may be caused by lack of observations of AUDT 
in high liquidity. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper tests these hypotheses with empirical results in Indonesia using a sample 
of 165 firms for 11 years (2006-2016). Our results show that stock liquidity negatively 
affects leverage in Indonesia. Therefore it confirms the hypothesis that firms with higher 
liquidity prefer to use less debt in their capital structure. Moreover, corporate governance 
quality also negatively affect leverage. Lastly, corporate governance effect on leverage is 
only significant for firms with higher stock liquidity and insignificant for illiquid firms in 
Indonesia. This study suggest the importance of firms’ corporate governance and their 
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